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Abstract
Sensor networks are composed of resource constrained tiny sensor devices.
They have less computational power and memory. Communication in sensor net-
work is done in multi-hop, and for secure communication, neighboring sensor nodes
must possess a secret common key among them. Symmetric and public key cryp-
tography require more processing and memory space. Hence, they are not suitable
for sensor network. Key pre-distribution is a widely accepted mechanism for key
distribution in sensor network.
In this thesis we proposed a deterministic key pre-distribution scheme using
BCH codes. We mapped the BCH code to key identifier and the keys correspond-
ing to each key identifier are installed into the sensor nodes before deployment. We
compared our proposed scheme with existing one and found that it has a better
resiliency. Our proposed scheme is scalable and requires the same or less number
of keys for a given number of nodes than the existing well known schemes. We
have also proposed an efficient key revocation technique using a novel distributed
voting mechanism in which neighboring nodes of a sensor can vote against it if
they suspect the node to be a compromised one. In the proposed key revoca-
tion scheme compromised nodes as well as the compromised keys are completely
removed from the network.
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Introduction
Cryptography has been used from a very long time by human being for secure com-
munication. Today, when the electronic communication is growing rapidly, need
for secure communication is also growing at a brisk speed. Hence cryptography
is now of immense importance. Cryptography is a set of mathematical operations
and algorithms by which we can preserve the secrecy of a data while transmitted
through insecure channel. The four main goals of a cryptographic algorithm are
1. Confidentiality : Hiding data from the unauthorized users.
2. Data Integrity : Protection of data from alteration.
3. Authentication : Verification of sender.
4. Non Repudiation : Prevention of malicious users from hiding their inactivity.
Key is the most important component for most of the Cryptographic algorithms.
Keys are generally numbers randomly selected from a large set of numbers. Man-
agement of these keys are very important in cryptography. Management of keys
includes the following:
1. Key Generation : It is the process in which a pool of keys are generated.
Mainly it is done in off-line mode by a trusted authority.
2. Key Establishment : It is the most important phase of key management
process. Key establishment is the process by which right keys for right users
can be determined and key rings for each users are sent to them accordingly.
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Key establishment can be done in many ways. Trusted Authority can help in
sending the keys to each user through a secure channel. But this mechanism
is a costly one and does not suit for sensor networks. So, in sensor network
we use Key Pre-distribution in which key rings are installed in the nodes
before deployment of network in off-line mode.
3. Key Updation : It is the process by which we can update the keys of all the
users after a certain time interval.
4. Key Revocation : This process is the deletion of compromised keys.
Based on the use of key, cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two
types.
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography : Same key is used for encryption and decryp-
tion module.
2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography : Different keys are used for encryption and
decryption.
Asymmetric cryptography needs huge computational and communicational costs.
So, for those areas where resources are constrained, symmetric cryptography is
used. Sensor network security is one such area.
1.1 Sensor Network
Recently a lot of research is going on in the area of sensor network. Sensor network
is composed of large number of tiny resource constrained sensor nodes with no
fixed network topology. It has a wide range of applications in military as well as
in civilian services. Some of the applications of sensor networks has been listed
below.
1. Sensor nodes are deployed in a battlefield to detect enemy intrusion.
2. They are also used to measure various environmental variables such as tem-
perature, heat, sound, pressure, magnetic and seismic fields etc. of a region.
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3. Sensor network has several use in industry such as in machine health moni-
toring, waste water monitoring etc.
4. It is used for traffic monitoring also.
5. Detection of bio-chemical or any explosive material is also possible with this.
6. They are used for security in public places.
7. Sensor networks are used in parking zone to help parking cars.
1.2 Key Management in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
Because of the various application it has in different fields, the data which are
transmitted needs to be kept secret. For example in military applications all
the data transmitted through the network are critical and secure communication
is needed for them. So cryptographic key management is a challenging task in
wireless sensor networks. But sensor networks have some characteristics which
make it difficult to communicate securely. Some of those characteristics are listed
below:
1. Generally sensor networks consist of large number of sensor nodes which
makes it difficult to secure each and every nodes. Sensor nodes are very
inexpensive tiny devices and most of the time they are kept unattended.
That makes them a victim of physical attack.
2. Sensor nodes are constrained in resources which makes difficult to imple-
ment complex cryptographic algorithms. We have discussed previously that
because of constrained resources it is difficult to implement public key cryp-
tography in sensor networks.
3. Wireless nature of the networks makes it easier to eavesdrop.
4. There is no definite network topology in sensor network. Because of that it
is difficult to implement any protocols.
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Because of these challenges, key establishment is a very challenging task in sensor
network. Key establishment via a trusted center through secure channel is difficult
to implement because of it is too costly. So, we generally use key pre-distribution
as a procedure to establish keys in case of sensor networks. Key pre-distribution
is a mechanism in which keys for each node are chosen from a large key pool. The
main goals of a good key pre-distribution algorithm are
1. Key connectivity: If two sensor nodes share some common key as well as
they are in communication range of each other then they can communicate
with each other. The probability that any two nodes can communicate with
each other must be high. Connectivity is defined as Pc =
L
N(N−1)
2
where L
is the number of links in the network and N is the number of nodes in the
network.
2. Resiliency: Once some nodes are captured or compromised, the rest of the
network must be least affected. It is measured as the fraction of links dis-
connected when s number of nodes are compromised. Resiliency E(s) = L
1
L
where L is the number of links present before s nodes are compromised and
L1 is the number of links present after s nodes are compromised.
3. Storage requirement and Computational cost: Storage requirement should
be as less as possible as sensor nodes are tiny devices which have lesser
memory capacity. Computational cost of the algorithm also should be less.
4. Key Revocation : There should be an efficient mechanism for revoking the
keys.
Key establishment process in Wireless sensor networks mainly consists of three
phases.
1. Key pre-distribution : Pre-loading keys in sensor nodes prior to deployment.
The keys present in a sensor node constitute the key ring of the sensor.
2. Shared key discovery : To find a common shared key between two commu-
nicating nodes.
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3. Path key establishment : If a common key does not exists, then a path has to
be found between the communicating nodes. A path key is then established
between the communicating nodes.
Key pre-distribution can be of three types:
1. Probabilistic : Key ring of each node is made drawing keys from a key pool
randomly.
2. Deterministic : Key ring of each node is made following some definite pat-
tern.
3. Hybrid : Makes use of the above two approaches.
Our approach to key pre-distribution is based on deterministic algorithm.
1.3 Design Theory
As most of the deterministic algorithms use design theory, in this section we briefly
discuss some of the design theories for the sake of completeness.
A set system or design [3] is a pair (X,A), where A is a set of subsets of X,
called blocks. The elements of X are called varieties or elements. A Balanced
Incomplete Block Design BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ), is a design which satisfy the following
conditions:
1. |X|= v, |A|= b.
2. Each subset in A contains exactly k elements,
3. Each variety in X occurs in r blocks,
4. Each pair of varieties in X is contained in exactly λ blocks in A.
When v = b, the BIBD is called a symmetric BIBD (SBIBD) and denoted by
SB[v, k, λ].
An association scheme with m associate classes on the set X is a family of m
symmetric anti-reflexive binary relations on X such that:
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1. any two distinct elements of X are i-th associates for exactly one value of i,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
2. each element of X has ni i-th associates, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
3. for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, if x and y are i-th associates, then there are pijl
elements of X which are both j-th associates of x and l-th associates of y.
The numbers v, ni (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and pijl (1 ≤ i, j, l ≤ m) are called the
parameters of the association scheme.
A partially balanced incomplete block design with m associate classes, denoted by
PBIBD(m) is a design on a v-set X, with b blocks each of size k and with each
element of X being repeated r times, such that if there is an association scheme
with m classes defined on X where, two elements x and y are i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
associates, then they occur together in λi blocks. We denote such a design by
PB[k, λ1, λ2, ...., λm; v].
Let X be a set of varieties such that
X = ∪mi=1Gi, |Gi|= n for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Gi ∩Gj = ∅ for i 6= j.
The Gi s are called groups and an association scheme defined on X is said to
be group divisible if the varieties in the same group are first associates and those
in different groups are second associates.
A transversal design TD(k, λ; r), with k groups of size r and index λ, is a triple
(X,G,A) where
1. X is a set of kr elements (varieties).
2. G = (G1, G2, ....., Gk) is a family of k sets (each of size r) which form a
partition of X.
3. A is a family of k-sets (or blocks) of varieties such that each k-set in A
intersects each group Gi in precisely one variety, and any pair of varieties
which belong to different groups occur together in precisely λ blocks in A.
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1.4 Motivation
We have already told that key pre-distribution in sensor network is a challenging
task. Eschenaur and Gligor [4] was the first to address a probabilistic solution
to this problem. Then Camtepe and Yener [5, 6], Lee and Stinson [7, 8] and
many others proposed deterministic solution to this problem with the help of
design theory. Ruj and Roy [9] was the first to provide a solution using Reed-
Solomon code. They first use the coding theory as a deterministic solution to
key pre-distribution. Our motivation was to check with other coding techniques
to distribute the keys so that we can get better resiliency. We have got better
resiliency using BCH code. Our approach is also scalable. Our motivation for
proposing the key revocation method was to design a distributed approach so that
all the compromised nodes as well as all the compromised keys can be removed.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The organization of rest of the thesis and a brief outline of the chapters in this
thesis is as follows.
In chapter 1 we have described about sensor network, its application and char-
acteristics, key pre-distribution problem, its different aspects and the motivation
behind our thesis.
In chapter 2 some related works on key pre-distribution and key revocation
and their merits and demerits have been discussed.
In chapter 3 we have described our proposed approach on key pre-distribution.
We have used BCH code for key pre-distribution and map the BCH code to key
identifier and the key corresponding to each key identifier are installed into the
sensor nodes before deployment. Then we have showed the scalability of our ap-
proach and analysis and comparison with some existing approach.
In chapter 4 We have described our approach to key revocation. We have
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shown some problems with the distributed approach of Chan et. al. [2] and pro-
posed two new distributed approach which overcome those problems. We analyze
our technique in terms of computational and communicational costs.
We conclude our thesis in chapter 5.
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Background
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part we have presented a brief
literature survey of different key pre-distribution schemes. In the second part we
have discussed about various key revocation schemes proposed so far.
2.1 Background of Key Pre-distribution Schemes
All the key pre-distribution schemes can be divided into three according to the
way of choosing keys for each node from the key pool. They are :
1. Probabilistic : Keys are drawn randomly and placed into the sensors.
2. Deterministic : Keys are drawn based on some definite pattern.
3. Hybrid : Makes use of both the above techniques.
To discuss about the schemes in a better way we have divided them into some
parts and we have discussed below about each part in respective subsections.
2.1.1 Basic Schemes
First we will discuss about two basic schemes which though were not meant for
wireless sensor networks, but they have been used in context of wireless sensor
networks. Those two schemes are Blom’s scheme and Blundo et. al. ’s scheme.
Blom [10] proposed a key pre-distribution scheme that allows any two nodes
of a group to find a pairwise key. The security parameter of the scheme is c, i.e.,
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as long as no more than c nodes are compromised, the network is perfectly secure.
They have used one public matrix and one secret symmetric matrix to construct
this scheme. Each node will have the share of those matrix such that any two
nodes can calculate a common key between them without knowing each other’s
secret matrix share. The problem with this scheme is that if more than c number
of nodes are compromised, the whole network will be compromised.
In the scheme proposed by Blundo, Santis, Herzberg, Kutten, Vaccaro, Yung
[11], they used a symmetric bivariate polynomial over some finite field GF(q).
Symmetric bivariate polynomial is a polynomial P(x, y) ∈ GF (q)[x, y] with the
property that P (i, j) = P (j, i) for all i, j ∈ GF (q). A node with ID Ui stores
a share in P, which is an univariate polynomial fi(y) = P(i, y). In order to com-
municate with node Uj , it computes the common key Kij = fi(j) = fj(i); this
process enables any two nodes to share a common key. If P has degree t, then
each share consists of a degree t univariate polynomial; each node must then store
the t + 1 coefficients of this polynomial. So, each node requires space for storing
t + 1 keys. If an adversary captures s nodes, where s ≤ t, then it can not get any
information about keys established between uncompromised nodes. However, if it
captures t + 1 or more nodes then all the keys of the network can be captured.
Now we will discuss about the basic schemes which were proposed for wireless
sensor networks.
Eschenauer and Gligor first proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme [4]
for wireless sensor networks. They divided the key pre-distribution mechanism
into three steps: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery and path-key estab-
lishment. In this approach, a key ring for a node containing some fixed number of
keys are chosen randomly without replacement from a key pool of large number
of keys. Each node is assigned a key ring.The key identifiers of a key ring and
corresponding sensor identifiers are stored in a trusted controller node. Now a
shared key may not exist between two nodes. In that case, if there exists a path
of nodes sharing keys pairwise between those two nodes, they may communicate
12
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via that path. They have also shown that for a network of 10000 nodes, a key ring
containing 250 keys is enough for almost full connectivity. When sensor nodes are
compromised, key revocation is needed. For this a controller node broadcasts a
revocation message containing the list of identifiers of keys which have been com-
promised and all the nodes after getting the message removes the compromised
keys from the key ring. The main advantages of this scheme are that the scheme
is flexible, scalable, efficient and easy to implement. However, the main disad-
vantages are that it cannot be used in regions which are prone to massive node
capture attack.
Chan Perrig and Song [1] modified Eschenauer and Gligor scheme. Accord-
ing to their q-composite scheme two nodes must share at-least q number of keys
to have a secure path between them. The path key will be formed by the hash
of all the common keys. Though for small number of node capture, resiliency
was improved, the resiliency was affected drastically as number of captured nodes
increases.
2.1.2 Random Pairwise Scheme
In the random pairwise scheme, proposed by Chan, Perrig and Song [1], they have
proposed that in a network of size N and minimum connection probability of two
nodes is p, each node will store k number of keys where k = N × p. The key pre-
distribution, shared key discovery and path key establishment is done as in [4].
Node revocation for compromised nodes are done by voting of all the nodes in the
network with a suitable threshold parameter. But the disadvantage of this scheme
is that it is not scalable and choosing the threshold value for node revocation is
very important as it can lead to other problems.
The pairwise key scheme of Liu and Ning [12] is based on the polynomial pool
based key pre-distribution by Blundo et. al. [11]. They have shown the calculation
for the probability that two nodes share a common key. They have also shown the
probability that a key is compromised. Later it was extended in [13] where they
modified the scheme into a hypercube based key pre-distribution.
Zhu, Xu, Setia and Jajodia [14] also proposed a random pairwise scheme based
13
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on probabilistic key sharing where two nodes can establish shared keys without
the help of an online KDC and only knowing each other’s key id. Communication
overhead in this scheme is very low. But if any node in the path is compromised
then the key establishment process has to be restarted.
2.1.3 Grid-based Key Pre-distribution Schemes
Chan and Perrig was the first to propose a grid based key pre-distribution scheme
where they place all the nodes of a network in a square grid. The scheme was
named as PIKE scheme [15]. In that scheme, each node will have a secret pairwise
key with the nodes which lie in the same row or same column. So for a network
of size N , each node has to store 2(
√
N − 1) number of keys. If two nodes do not
have any shared key, they will have exactly two intermediate nodes having shared
key with both the nodes. Here any node can act as an intermediary. Hence, it
reduces the battery drainage of the nodes near base station who have to serve as
intermediary most of the time in other schemes. But the main disadvantage of
this scheme is that it has high communication overhead. Because large number
of key pairs will not have common key between them, path-key establishment will
be very much time consuming.
In [16], Kalindi et. al. modified the PIKE scheme. They placed the nodes as
well as the keys in a grid and divide the grid into some sub-grids. A node will
have all the keys in its key chain which lie in its same row or column and which
are in its same or neighboring sub-grids. Key needed to store in each node can be
much less than [15] if number of sub-grids are more. It will increase the resiliency
but decrease the connectivity. The reverse will happen if number of sub-grids is
lesser. Nodes belonging to the same sub-grid and in same row or same column
share more keys. But they are not allowed to use all the common keys because
capturing of one node of a row or column will reveal all the keys of that row and
column.
Sadi, Kim and Park [17] proposed another grid based random scheme based
on bivariate polynomials. In this scheme, they will first arrange they nodes into a
m×m square grid. After that some 2mω bivariate polynomials will be generated
14
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and they will be divided into some group such that each row and each column will
be assigned one group of polynomials. A node then will select some 2τ number
of polynomials from its row polynomial group and column polynomial group. If
two nodes are in same row or in same column, they use a challenge response
protocol to find whether they are sharing a common polynomial. If they a shared
polynomial, they can setup a shared key. Otherwise they will have to go for path
key establishment and they will have to find two other intermediate nodes such
that a path can be established. In this case also the communication overhead is
high.
Abedelaziz Mohaisen, YoungJae Maeng and DaeHun Nyang [18] proposed a
3-dimensional grid based key pre-distribution. According to their scheme, If the
network size is N, then all the node of the network is arranged in a m ×m ×m
grid where m = N
1
3 . Now 3N
1
3 symmetric polynomials will be distributed among
the nodes in such a way that all the nodes with the same axis value owns the
share of same corresponding polynomial. Two nodes having same axis value will
share common polynomial and key can be prepared from that. The probability of
connectivity is 3
m+1
. Though the communication overhead is low in this scheme
than the previous schemes, the resiliency is very poor.
2.1.4 Group Based Key Pre-distribution
Liu, Ning and Du observed that sensor nodes in the same group are usually close to
each other and they proposed a group based key pre-distribution scheme without
using deployment knowledge [19, 20]. They divide the nodes of a network into
groups and then form cross groups taking exactly one sensor node from each group
such that there will not be any common node between any two cross groups. They
presented two instantiations of pre-distribution. In the first one, hash function
were used. Two nodes will share a common key if they are in same group or in
same cross group. If the number nodes in the network is N and they are divided
into n groups each containing m nodes, N = n ×m and each node need to store
m+n
2
keys. In the second method, they used symmetric bivariate polynomials and
assign a unique polynomial to each group and cross group. Every node will have
15
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share of the polynomials corresponding to their groups and cross groups. The
advantages of this scheme are that it does not do not use deployment knowledge
and give resiliency and connectivity similar to the deployment knowledge based
schemes. The polynomial based schemes can be made scalable. The framework
can be used to improve any existing pre-distribution schemes. The disadvantages
of this scheme is that the probability of secure communication between cross-group
neighbors is very less. The scheme is not suitable for networks which have small
group size.
To overcome the problems of Liu et al’s scheme [20], Martin Paterson and
Stinson [21] proposed a group based design using resolvable transversal designs.
To increase the cross group connectivity, they proposed that each node is contained
in m cross groups rather than one. Though some additional storage is required.
They did not give any algorithm for the construction of such designs.
Table 2.1: Various generalized quadrangles used by Camtepe and Yener and their
different parameters
Design s t v b k r
GQ(q, q) q q (q + 1)(q2 + 1) (q + 1)(q2 + 1) q + 1 q + 1
GQ(q, q2) q q2 (q + 1)(q3 + 1) (q2 + 1)(q3 + 1) q + 1 q2 + 1
GQ(q2, q3) q2 q3 (q2 + 1)(q5 + 1) (q3 + 1)(q5 + 1) q2 + 1 q3 + 1
2.1.5 Key Pre-distribution Using Combinatorial Structures
In the schemes which use combinatorial structures, one of their greatest advantage
is that almost all of them have efficient shared key discovery algorithm with which
easily two nodes can find their common key.
Camtepe and Yener Scheme
Camtepe and Yener were the first to use combinatorial structures in key pre-
distribution [5, 6]. They first used projective planes and then generalized quad-
rangles. A finite projective plane PG(2,q) (where q is a prime power) is same as
the symmetric BIBD, BIBD(q2+q+1, q2+q+1, q+1, q+1, 1). So, q2+q+1 number
of nodes can be accommodated in the network each node having q + 1 number of
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Table 2.2: Connection Probability and Resiliency(fail(1)) for different value of t
In Camtepe and Yener scheme
Connection Probability Fail(1)
t = 2 1 1
p
t = 3 q
2+3q+2
2(q2+q+1)
3
q(q+2)
t = 4 2q
2+q+3
3q2+3
3q3−3q2+13q−1
4q4+2q3+6q2
t = 5 5q
4+10q3+7q2+10q8
8(q4+q3+q2+q+1)
8q5+18q4−26q3+73q2−15q+2
15q6+15q5+6q4+24q3
t = 6 19q
4+16q3+19q2+6q+30
30(q4+q2+1)
45q7+30q6+145q5−230q4+511q3−186q2+51q−6
4(19q8+16q7+19q6+6q5+30q4)
keys. It ensures 100% connectivity. But the resiliency was very poor. Also for a
network containing large number of nodes, storage requirement will be relatively
large. For a network of size N, each node needs to store approximately
√
N number
of keys. To get better result, they used generalized quadrangles, GQ(s,t) where
s and t are the two parameters of GQ. Three designs were used : GQ(q, q) was
constructed from PG(4, q), GQ(q, q2) was constructed from PG(5, q), GQ(q2, q3)
was constructed from PG(4, q2). Camtepe and Yener have mapped these GQs in
key pre-distribution [5, 6] like this :
v = number of keys = (s + 1)(st + 1), b = number of nodes = (t + 1)(st + 1), r
= number of keys in each node = (s + 1), and k = key chains that a key is in =
(t + 1) for all the three GQs, these parameters are given in Table 2.1. Here q is
taken as any prime or prime power.
Probability that two node will share a common key in these GQs are t(s+1)
(t+1)(st+1)
.
Though GQs do not give 100% connection probability, resiliency is much better
than projective planes. Also the storage requirement in these cases is less than
that of projective planes.
Lee and Stinson Scheme
Lee and Stinson [7] formalized the definitions of key pre-distribution schemes using
set systems. They introduced the idea of common intersection designs [8]. They
used block graphs for sensors and according to them, every pair of nodes can be
connected by maximum of 2-hop path. They have shown that (v,b,r,k)-1 design
or the (v,b,r,k) configuration have regular block graphs with vertex degrees max-
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imized. So, connectivity will be largest in this case. So, they have used (v,b,r,k)
configuration. In a (v,b,r,k) configuration having b-1 = k(r-1), all the nodes are
connected to each other and it’s same as projective planes. But for large network,
the key-chain in each node will be large. So, they introduced µ-common intersec-
tion design. In that if two node’s key chain, Ai and Aj are disjoint, then there will
be at least µ number of nodes, Ah who has common keys with both Ai and Aj.
So, |AhA : Ai ∩ Ah 6= φ and Aj ∩ Ah 6= φ|≥ µ. They have also used transversal
design for key pre-distribution [7]. They have shown that for a prime number p
and a integer k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ p, there exists a transversal design TD(k,p).
In that design, p2 number of nodes can be arranged with k keys in each node in
such a way that (i,j)th node will have the keys (x, xi+ j mod p) : 0 ≤ x ≤ k. for
0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ p− 1. If two nodes want to find common keys between
them they just need to exchange their node identifiers and the shared key algo-
rithm complexity is O(1). The communication overhead is O(log p) = O(log
√
N)
where N is the size of the network. They also gave the estimate of probability
of sharing a common key between two nodes and it is p1 =
k(r−1)
b−1 where k is the
keys per node, r is the number of nodes a key is in and b is the total number
of nodes in the network. The estimate for resiliency for s node capture is fail(s)
= 1 − (1 − r−2
b−2 )
s. A multiple space has also been presented by Lee and Stinson
in [22].
Chakraborty et. al. Scheme
Chakrabarti, Maitra and Roy [23, 24] proposed a hybrid key pre-distribution
scheme by merging the blocks in combinatorial designs. They first showed that if
one considers 4 Kbytes of memory space for storing keys in a sensor node, then
choosing 128-bit key (16 byte), it is possible to accommodate 256 many keys. So,
storage capacity can be increased in order to increase resiliency of the network.
They considered Lee and Stinson construction and randomly selected some fixed
number of blocks and merged them to form key chains. Though their proposed
scheme increased the number of keys per node, it improved the resiliency than Lee
and Stinson’s Scheme [7].
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Dong et. al. Scheme on 3-design
Dong et al in [25] proposed a scheme based on 3-design. If q is a prime power,
then there exists a 3-(qn + 1, q + 1, 1) design with number of blocks = q
n(q2n−1)
q(q2−1)
for n ≥ 2. They actually used a 3-(q2 + 1, q + 1, 1) design with n = 2. In that,
q3 + q number of nodes can be accommodated in the network with each node
having q + 1 number of keys. Maximum number of keys shared between any two
nodes is two. Connectivity of this scheme is
1
2
q3+ 3
2
q2−1
q3+q2−1 . Resiliency of this scheme
for a single node capture is 3q
2+q−2
q4+2q3−q2+2q−2 . From the above formulas, we can tell
that for large value of q, connectivity is almost 1
2
and resiliency for a single node
capture is almost zero. But the biggest disadvantage of this scheme is that the
resiliency reduces drastically as the number of compromised nodes increases.
Dong et. al. on Orthogonal Arrays
Dong et al have proposed a key pre-distribution scheme based on orthogonal array.
[26]. In that work, they have taken orthogonal array of index one and used Bush’s
construction for orthogonal array construction. from that construction, for any
prime p we will get a network containing key pool size of p2 + 1, number of
nodes = pt for an integer t and number of keys per node = p + 1. The authors
have shown the connection probability and resiliency for different value of t. We
present it in Table - 2. They have shown that when the value of t tends to infinity,
the connection probability is almost 0.632121 and when the value of p tends to
infinity, value of fail(1) tends to zero. They have compared their scheme with
Lee and Stinson’s scheme and shown that it has better connection probability and
resiliency than Lee and Stinson’s scheme [7]. Also, choosing a correct value of t,
one can get better connectivity than [25].
Ruj and Roy Scheme
Ruj and Roy proposed a scheme using triangular PBIBD [27] and they found that
for a network of size N, only about O
(√
N) keys per node is needed and they got
a highly connected resilient and scalable network.
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2.1.6 Key Pre-distribution Using Deployment Knowledge
Location dependent key pre-distribution were first proposed by Liu and Ning [28].
They proposed two schemes taking advantage of the location information. Ac-
cording to them, as sensors are deployed in group, nodes in the same group have
higher probability of being deployed close to each other. In their first scheme,
i.e., closest pairwise scheme, they proposed that a node will have pairwise keys
with the nodes which are close to each other. In the second scheme, they used
polynomial based key pre-distribution like [11]. They divide the nodes in groups
and assign each group a unique symmetric bivariate polynomial. A node will have
share of polynomials of its own group as well as its four neighbor groups. Com-
mon key can be calculated between the nodes who are in the same or neighboring
groups like [11].
Du et al proposed a key pre-distribution scheme using deployment knowledge
in [29]. which they extended in [30]. This scheme is based on grid group de-
ployment scheme where sensor nodes are deployed in groups such that a group
of sensors are deployed in a single deployment point. The deployment model was
given in [30]. They used Blom’s scheme [10] for key pre-distribution in [31, 32].
But they modified it into multiple key spaces. In their deployment scheme, If two
groups are neighbors, then their will be some amount of overlap between their
respective key pools, i.e., they will have some number of common keys in their
key pools. But if two groups are far away from each other, then the overlap will
decrease and it can be even zero. This scheme uses less number of keys and gives
higher connectivity and better resiliency. But the complexity of this scheme is its
main disadvantage.
Yu and Guan [33, 34] proposed a key pre-distribution scheme using deploy-
ment knowledge and compared the effect of having triangular, hexagonal and
square grids. They showed that the hexagonal grids are giving better perfor-
mance in case of both connectivity and resiliency. They used Blom’s scheme for
key pre-distribution. They divided the nodes into groups and placed them in a
grid according to deployment knowledge. A public matrix is generated for all the
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groups and some private matrices are generated for each group. Each node will
have their share from the public matrix as well as from their respective group’s pri-
vate matrix. That will help the nodes in the same groups to make a common key.
For communication between nodes of neighbor groups, they declared some groups
as basic groups and assign each of them one unique private matrix to them. Non
basic groups will have all the matrices of their neighboring basic groups. Nodes
of each group will have share of its own group’s matrices. Any two neighboring
groups will have common private matrix. So, any two nodes from two neighboring
groups can establish a key with the help of that private matrix. So, this scheme
produces a high connectivity between neighboring nodes.
Huang, Mehta, Medhi and Harn [35] proposed a grid-group based key pre-
distribution scheme. This scheme is perfectly secure to random node capture as
well as perfectly secure to selective node capture. Their approach is similar to Du
et al using multiple space Blom’s scheme.
Simonova, Ling and Wang discussed a homogeneous scheme in [36]. According
to them, each grid in the network will have a disjoint key pool. Nodes from the
same grid will communicate via this. There will another key pool called deploy-
ment key pool which will be constructed from neighboring key pools. Nodes from
two neighboring grid can communicate via keys of the deployment key pool. Zhou,
Ni and Ravishankar was first to propose a key pre-distribution scheme in [37] where
sensors are mobile.
2.2 Background of Key Revocation Schemes
Key revocation problem was first addressed by Eschenaur and Gligor [4]. They
proposed a centralized approach to key revocation in which a controller node
broadcast a message to each node in the network informing about the compromised
keys. In this scheme a signature key needs to be sent to each node a priori to the
broadcast message.
A distributed approach to key revocation was first proposed by Chan et al
in [1] and later it was extended by them in [2]. They have used distributed voting
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mechanism with the help of polynomial secret sharing. Their proposed scheme
can revoke the compromised node but may not fully revoke the compromised keys
of that node.
Wang et. al. [38] proposed a key updating techniques to obsolete the keys used
by the compromised nodes. They first proposed the idea of sessions to be used.
They divided the total life span of a network into some sessions. A session key
is broadcast at the beginning of each session to update the keys in each node in
such a way that compromised nodes can not get this session key and their keys
will become obsolete. This process was a centralized one.
Park et. al. [39] proposed the idea of dynamic session to reduce the life time
of a compromised node in the network. They modified the centralized scheme of
Wang et. al. [38] and they proposed the duration of each session not to be fixed.
It reduces the time a compromised node can stay in the network.
Moore et. al. [40] proposed a suicide strategy to revoke compromised nodes in
the network. In their strategy, in order to revoke a compromised node, a legitimate
node has to die. This is an overhead of this strategy.
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Chapter 3
Key Pre-distribution Using BCH
Code
In this chapter, we discuss our proposed key pre-distribution mechanism using
BCH code. We have mapped the BCH code to key identifier and the key cor-
responding to each key identifier are installed into the sensor nodes before de-
ployment. We have found that our proposed scheme has a better resiliency and
required the same or less number of keys to be stored in each sensor for a given
number of nodes than the existing well known schemes. Our proposed scheme is
also scalable too, in the sense, the addition of new nodes into the network does
not require alteration, addition or modification of keys in the nodes present in the
network.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow.
In section 3.1 we have discussed few terms and definitions for the better under-
standing of code as well as BCH code and its characteristics. Section 3.2 discusses
the detail key pre-distribution algorithm along with example. In section 3.3 we
have discussed about the shared key discovery and path key establishment phase.
Scalability of our scheme has been shown with a suitable example in section 3.4.
In section 3.5 we have shown the results and compare them with that of some
existing schemes. We have conclude the chapter in section 3.6.
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3.1 Terms and Definitions
In this section we briefly discuss the BCH code along with the related terminolo-
gies and definitions for the sake of completeness.
A code is a pair (Q,C ) such that the following properties are satisfied [3] :
(i) Q is a set of symbols.
(ii) C is a set of d -tuples of symbols called codeword where d ≥ 1 and d is an
integer.
A code is said to be a linear code if it posses the following properties:
(i) Sum of any two codewords belonging to same code is also a valid codeword
belonging to that code,
(ii) All zero codeword is always a valid codeword, and
(iii) Minimum hamming distance will be the minimum weight of any non zero
codeword.
A code is said to be a cyclic code if it is linear and any cyclic shift of a code-
word is also a codeword belonging to the same code.
BCH code [41] is a cyclic linear block code, constructed from an alphabet set
P. Length of the codewords are n = pm - 1 where m is an integer and |P|= p.
A generator polynomial g(x) is used to derive the codewords. Total number of
possible codewords for an alphabet set P is pk where k = n− deg(g(x)). Here deg
(g(x)) represents the highest degree of x in the generator polynomial g(x). The
process of finding the generator polynomial for a particular code is described in
Section 4.
Galois field, GF, is a field with finite number of elements. GF(q) has q number
of elements. A GF of order qm, that is GF(qm), can be constructed from GF(q)
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where m is an integer. In such cases, GF(q) is called base field and GF(qm) is
called extension field.
Primitive polynomial f(x) over any Galois field is a prime polynomial over that
GF with the property that in the extension field constructed from modulo f(x),
every element of the extension field except zero can be expressed as a power of x.
If GF(q) is the base field and GF(qm) is the extension field, then xn−1 can be
factorized over GF(q) where n = qm − 1. Let say, xn − 1 = f1(x)f2(x) .......fp(x).
In the extension field, xn − 1 = Π(x− βj) where βj are all the non-zero elements
of GF(qm). Here, we can say that each βj is a solution of exactly one of the fi(x).
This fi(x) is called the minimal polynomial of the corresponding βj.
Set of elements in the extension field sharing the same minimal polynomial
over base field are called conjugates with respect to GF(q).
If f(x) is the minimal polynomial of an element,say β, in the extension field then
the conjugate set including β will be (β, βq, βq
2
, ..........., βq
r−1
) where βq
r−1
= β
for any integer r.
3.2 Key Pre-distribution Using BCH Code
In this section, we explain the key pre-distribution using Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem
(BCH) codes. The proposed scheme is scalable. Key pre-distribution in the pro-
posed scheme is carried out in two phases. First phase consists of the construction
of BCH codewords. In the second phase, we derive the key identifiers for each
sensor from the BCH codeword. Each node is represented by means of a unique
node polynomial derived from GF(p). The codeword is obtained in the First
phase. Then in the second phase identifiers for each node is derived from the
codeword obtained in the First phase. We describe below the two phases in key
pre-distribution.
First Phase : The following steps are carried out in this phase to construct
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BCH codewords.
Step 1 : Choose the length of the codeword, n, such that n = pm − 1 where p is a
prime or a prime power, and m is an integer.
Step 2 : Choose a primitive polynomial over GF(p) of degree m and construct GF(pm).
Step 3 : Find the set of conjugates from the elements of the GF(pm). For each set of
conjugates find the minimal polynomial corresponding to that set.
Step 4 : Choose a value, t, which is the maximum number of errors BCH code can
correct. The generator polynomial for the codewords is given by
g(x) = LCM [f1(x), f2(x), ...., f2t(x)]
where fi(x) is the minimal polynomial of the i
th element of GF(pm). Com-
pute the value of k = n − deg(g(x)). Maximum number of nodes in the
network will be pk. The value of t is chosen in such a way that pk will cover
the network size.
Step 5 : To obtain the polynomial of individual codewords, multiply each of the pk
number of node polynomials of degree k-1 in GF(p) with the generator poly-
nomial. Here, each pk number of node polynomials means all the polynomials
of degree k-1 whose coefficients are from GF(p).
Second Phase : In this phase we derive the key identifiers for each sensor from
the codewords formed in first phase. The codeword for each node derived in the
First phase is mapped to key identifiers, which will identify the keys to be assigned
to the sensor node. There is a unique key corresponding to each key identifier.
We derive n key identifiers from codeword (a1, a2, a3, ...., an) where each identifier
corresponds to an alphabet aj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Each key identifier is a triplet, con-
sisting of (aj, j, s) where j = 1,2,......,n and s is the relative position of appearance
of the alphabet aj in the codeword, i.e., s = (number of time aj occurred in the
codeword before the current occurrence + 1) mod pm−1.
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We have shown the mapping from BCH code to key pre-distribution in Ta-
ble 3.1. Each key identifiers are denoted by (aj, j, s) where, 0 ≤ aj ≤ p − 1,
1 ≤ j ≤ pm − 1 and
1 ≤ s ≤ j for j ≤ pm−1 − 1 and
0 ≤ s ≤ pm−1 − 1 for j ≥ pm−1
The number of keys in the key pool will be
p× (1 + 2 + .......+ pm−1) + P × pm−1 × (pm − 1− pm−1)
= p×p
m−1×(pm−1+1)
2
+ pm × (pm − pm−1 − 1)
= pm × (pm − pm−1
2
− 1
2
)
Number of nodes in the network is pk and number of keys per node is pm − 1.
Key pre-distribution Our construction
(aj, j, s)
where, o ≤ aj ≤ p− 1,
Key pool set (P) 1 ≤ j ≤ pm − 1 and
1 ≤ s ≤ j for j ≤ pm−1 − 1
0 ≤ s ≤ pm−1 − 1 for j ≥ pm−1
Key pool size(|P |) pm × (pm − pm−12 − 12 )
Number of key chains(|N|) pk
i.e., number of Nodes in network
Number of keys per node(k) pm − 1
Table 3.1: Mapping of parameters between key pre-distribution and their corre-
sponding parameters from BCH codes
Example : We illustrate below the generation of BCH code and its mapping
to key identifiers through an example.
First Phase :
Step 1 : Consider p = 2 and m = 3. The value of n is computed to be 7.
Step 2 : There are two primitive polynomials over GF(2) of degree 3. One is P (z) =
z3+z+1 and another is P (z) = z3+z2+1. We randomly choose one primitive
polynomial. In this example we consider the polynomial P (z) = z3 + z + 1.
Then we construct GF(23) as follows :
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β1 = z
β2 = z2
β3 = z3 = z + 1
β4 = z4 = z2 + z
β5 = z5 = z3 + z2 = z2 + z + 1
β6 = z6 = z3 + z2 + z = z2 + 1
β7 = z7 = z3 + z = 1
Step 3 : The conjugate sets and their corresponding minimal polynomials are given
in Table 3.2.
Conjugate sets Minimal polynomial
β1, β2, β4 (x3 + x+ 1)
β3, β6, β5(= β12) (x3 + x2 + 1)
β7 (x− 1)
Table 3.2: Conjugate sets and their corresponding minimal polynomials
Step 4 : We consider the value of t = 1. The generator polynomial g(x) = LCM[(minimal
polynomial of β1) , (minimal polynomial of β2)]
= LCM[(x3 + x+ 1), (x3 + x+ 1)]
= (x3 + x+ 1).
Value of k = 7− 3 = 4. Therefore, the number of nodes in the network is pk
= 24 = 16.
Step 5 : Each node have corresponding node polynomial of degree 3 in GF(2). We
obtain the code polynomial for each node by multiplying the node polynomial
for that node with the generator polynomial x3 + x + 1. Codeword for
each node is obtained from their respective code polynomial. Node ID,
node polynomial, code polynomial and their corresponding codeword for the
Sixteen nodes that we have considered in our example is shown in Table 3.3.
Second Phase : In this phase we derive the key chain for a node from its codeword.
For example the key identifiers corresponding to Node ID 1 is shown in Table 3.4.
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Node ID Node Polynomial Code Polynomial Code Representation
0 0 0 0000000
1 1 x3 + x+ 1 0001011
2 x x4 + x2 + x 0010110
3 x + 1 x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 0011101
4 x2 x5 + x3 + x2 0101100
5 x2 + 1 x5 + x2 + x+ 1 0100111
6 x2 + x x5 + x4 + x3 + x 0111010
7 x2 + x+ 1 x5 + x4 + 1 0110001
8 x3 x6 + x4 + x3 1011000
9 x3 + 1 x6 + x4 + x+ 1 1010011
10 x3 + x x6 + x3 + x2 + x 1001110
11 x3 + x+ 1 x6 + x2 + 1 1000101
12 x3 + x2 x6 + x5 + x4 + x2 1110100
13 x3 + x2 + 1 x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 1111111
14 x3 + x2 + x x6 + x5 + x 1100010
15 x3 + x2 + x+ 1 x6 + x5 + x3 + 1 1101001
Table 3.3: Node ID along with its corresponding node polynomial, code polynomial
and codeword for Sixteen number of nodes
Codeword 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Key identifiers (0,1,1) (0,2,2) (0,3,3) (1,4,1) (0,5,0) (1,6,2) (1,7,3)
Table 3.4: Key Identifiers for Node ID 1
After obtaining the key identifiers for a node the keys corresponding to the key
identifiers are installed in the node before deployment. Key identifiers of all the
Sixteen nodes considered in our example are shown in Table 3.5.
3.3 Shared Key Discovery and Path-Key Estab-
lishment Phase
In the shared key discovery phase, every node will broadcast their key identifiers
to all its neighbor nodes. Each neighbor nodes, after getting the key identifiers of
a particular node will match with its own key identifiers. The keys corresponding
to the matched key identifier will be the shared key between those two nodes.
For example Node 11 and Node 12 have a common key identifier (1,1,1). The
key corresponding to the key identifier (1,1,1) is used as the shared key for the
communication between them.
After the shared key discovery phase, if two neighboring nodes find no shared
key between them, then they will find a third node who is connected to both the
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Node ID Key Identifiers
0 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(0,3,3),(0,4,0),(0,5,1),(0,6,2),(0,7,3)
1 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(0,3,3),(1,4,1),(0,5,0),(1,6,2),(1,7,3)
2 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(1,3,1),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(1,6,3),(0,7,0)
3 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(1,3,1),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(0,6,3),(1,7,0)
4 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(0,3,2),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(0,6,3),(0,7,0)
5 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(0,3,2),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(1,6,3),(1,7,0)
6 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(1,3,2),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(1,6,0),(0,7,3)
7 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(1,3,2),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(0,6,0),(1,7,3)
8 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(1,3,2),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(0,6,3),(0,7,0)
9 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(1,3,2),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(1,6,3),(1,7,0)
10 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(0,3,2),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(1,6,0),(0,7,3)
11 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(0,3,2),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(0,6,0),(1,7,3)
12 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(1,3,3),(0,4,1),(1,5,0),(0,6,2),(0,7,3)
13 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(1,3,3),(1,4,0),(1,5,1),(1,6,2),(1,7,3)
14 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(0,3,1),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(1,6,3),(0,7,0)
15 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(0,3,1),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(0,6,3),(1,7,0)
Table 3.5: Key Identifiers of all the Sixteen nodes considered in the example
nodes and will establish the path key between the two nodes. For example, let A
and B be the first two nodes and C be the third node. If k1 is the key between A
and C and k2 is the key between B and C, then C will send k1 key to B encrypting
it with k2, and will send k2 key to A encrypting it with k1. Both node A and B
will create a secret key KAB = h(k1, k2) and erase k1 and k2 from their memory.
The key KAB is used as the secret key between A and B.
3.4 Scalability of the Scheme
The number of nodes N, that is addressable in the proposed scheme is pk. For ad-
dition of nodes into the network, we need to generate the codeword for the nodes
to be added. To generate the codeword for the nodes to be added, all the k degree
polynomials in GF(p) are multiplied with the generator polynomial, g(x). All the
polynomials of k degree whose coefficients are from GF(p) are taken into account
except those polynomials whose coefficient of xk is zero. We are not considering
polynomials whose coefficient of xk is zero because a polynomial of degree k in
GF(p) whose coefficient of xk is zero is nothing but a k − 1 degree polynomial
in GF(p). The codeword for the new nodes will be of n + 1 bits. However, the
codeword for the existing nodes are of n bits. We perform circular right shift of
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Node ID Node Polynomial Codeword Polynomial Code after circular left shift
16 x4 + 0 x7 + x5 + x4 01100001
17 x4 + 1 x7 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1 01110111
18 x4 + x x7 + x5 + x2 + x 01001101
19 x4 + x+ 1 x7 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 01011011
20 x4 + x2 x7 + x4 + x3 + x2 00111001
21 x4 + x2 + 1 x7 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1 00101111
22 x4 + x2 + x x7 + x3 + x 00010101
23 x4 + x2 + x+ 1 x7 + 1 00000011
24 x4 + x3 x7 + x6 + x5 + x3 11010001
25 x4 + x3 + 1 x7 + x6 + x5 + x+ 1 11000111
26 x4 + x3 + x x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x 11111101
27 x4 + x3 + x+ 1 x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1 11101011
28 x4 + x3 + x2 x7 + x6 + x2 10001001
29 x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 x7 + x6 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 10011111
30 x4 + x3 + x2 + x x7 + x6 + x4 + x 10100101
31 x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + 1 10110011
Table 3.6: Symbolic Code Representation and Code polynomial for all the newly
added Nodes
each newly formed codeword to get the desired codeword so that we can match the
key identifiers for the same power of x in the code polynomials for any two nodes.
The number of new nodes that can be added into the network is pk+1 − pk. The
number of keys to be installed in the new nodes will be n+1, whereas the number
of keys in the existing nodes will remain at n. We can add new nodes into the net-
work without changing the keys of the existing nodes. Thus the scheme is scalable.
We explain the scalability by means of an example. Suppose a network has
Sixteen number of nodes and the key identifiers associated with each node in the
network is shown in Table 3.5. Number of keys installed at each node is Seven.
Suppose we want to add sixteen more nodes to the existing network. Table
3.6 shows the codeword for the newly added nodes and Table 3.7 shows the key
identifiers to be installed in each node. The number of keys to be installed in
the new nodes is Eight, shown in Table 3.7 whereas there are Seven keys in the
existing nodes, shown in Table 3.5. No changes has taken place in the number of
keys of existing nodes. This shows the scalability of the scheme. Next we show
that a node in the existing network can perform a secure communication with
newly added nodes.
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Node ID Key Identifiers
16 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(1,3,2),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(0,6,0),(0,7,1),(1,8,3)
17 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(1,3,2),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(1,6,0),(1,7,1),(1,8,2)
18 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(0,3,2),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(1,6,3),(0,7,0),(1,8,0)
19 (0,1,1),(1,2,1),(0,3,2),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(0,6,3),(1,7,0),(1,8,1)
20 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(1,3,1),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(0,6,3),(0,7,0),(1,8,0)
21 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(1,3,1),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(1,6,3),(1,7,0),(1,8,1)
22 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(0,3,3),(1,4,1),(0,5,0),(1,6,2),(0,7,1),(1,8,3)
23 (0,1,1),(0,2,2),(0,3,3),(0,4,0),(0,5,1),(0,6,2),(1,7,1),(1,8,2)
24 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(0,3,1),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(0,6,3),(0,7,0),(1,8,0)
25 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(0,3,1),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(1,6,3),(1,7,0),(1,8,1)
26 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(1,3,3),(1,4,0),(1,5,1),(1,6,2),(0,7,1),(1,8,3)
27 (1,1,1),(1,2,2),(1,3,3),(0,4,1),(1,5,0),(0,6,2),(1,7,1),(1,8,2)
28 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(0,3,2),(0,4,3),(1,5,2),(0,6,0),(0,7,1),(1,8,3)
29 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(0,3,2),(1,4,2),(1,5,3),(1,6,0),(1,7,1),(1,8,2)
30 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(1,3,2),(0,4,2),(0,5,3),(1,6,3),(0,7,0),(1,8,0)
31 (1,1,1),(0,2,1),(1,3,2),(1,4,3),(0,5,2),(0,6,3),(1,7,0),(1,8,1)
Table 3.7: Key Identifiers of all the newly added Sixteen number of nodes in the
network
Suppose an existing node, say Node 11, wants to communicate with a newly
added node, say Node 27. First they will exchange their key identifiers. The
key identifier (1,1,1) is found to be common between them. So, they will use the
key corresponding to the key identifier (1,1,1) for secure communication between
them. If no common key exists between them then they will create a secret key
between them during the path-key establishment phase.
3.5 Result and Comparison with Other Schemes
In this section, we have shown the result of network resiliency and number of keys
per node for different values of number of nodes in the network. Here, we have
assumed the value of m to 2. We have compared our result with two existing
schemes , Camtepe and Yener scheme [6] and Ruj and Roy scheme [9]. The met-
rics used for comparison is the number of node, the number of keys required per
node, number of compromised nodes, and the resiliency.
We have shown the resiliency of our scheme against random node capture
attack. It can be seen from Table 3.8 that our proposed scheme is more resilient.
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Proposed Scheme R R Scheme C Y Scheme
k N s Fail(s)
24 625 5 0.175251
24 625 10 0.316493
48 2401 10 0.142349
48 2401 15 0.229743
48 2401 20 0.355067
80 6561 10 0.070326
80 6561 20 0.230650
k N s Fail(s)
22 529 5 0.217391
22 529 10 0.434783
48 2401 10 0.186564
48 2401 15 0.2761
48 2401 20 0.408163
80 6561 10 0.123456
80 6561 20 0.246913
k N s Fail(s)
24 553 5 0.198915
24 553 10 0.397830
48 2257 10 0.203810
48 2257 15 0.305715
48 2257 20 0.407621
80 6321 10 0.123398
80 6321 20 0.246796
Table 3.8: Comparison of proposed key pre-distribution scheme with Ruj and Roy
(R R) scheme and Camtepe and Yener (C Y) scheme. Number of nodes in the
network is N, keys per node is k, number of compromised node is s and resiliency
is Fail(s)[Fail(s) is the probability of affected links due to the compromise of s
nodes].
Unlike deterministic schemes mentioned in [42], our scheme is scalable. In our
scheme, scalability can be increased without changing the keys of existing nodes
of the network.
3.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a key pre-distribution scheme using BCH codes. In
the proposed scheme, we have taken key pool based approach where key identifiers
of each node will be taken from a pool of key identifiers. The advantage of the
scheme over the other deterministic schemes is that in this scheme, new nodes can
be added to the network without changing the configuration of keys of the existing
nodes. Also by varying the value of the different parameters in the scheme we can
setup different sizes of network based on the requirement. Varying the values of t,
which is the number of errors BCH code can correct, we can accommodate desired
number of nodes with some acceptable resiliency. In future we would like to use
other coding scheme and see their performance.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Key Revocation Scheme
In this chapter we discuss two proposed key revocation schemes with distributed
voting procedure. In chapter 2 we have already told that Chan et. al. [1, 2] have
proposed a distributed voting procedure. But we have pointed out some problems
in that scheme and we have tried to overcome that with a new key revocation
scheme using a novel distributed voting mechanism. The rest of the chapter is
organized as follows.
In section 4.1 we have pointed out the problems with Chan et al’s scheme. We
have discussed the network model used for our proposed scheme in section 4.2.
Two proposed algorithms have been discussed in detail in section 4.3. We have
analyzed our scheme in section 4.4. We have concluded the chapter in section 4.5.
4.1 Problems with Chan et. al. [1,2] Key Revo-
cation Mechanism
In this section we discuss the problems associated with Chan et. al.’s [1,2] scheme.
1. It is possible to remove a compromised node from the network, however
it may not be possible to remove all its keys from the network. We give a
scenario to support our claim. Let us consider two nodes, u and v, sharing a
common key, say k1. Suppose they are deployed far away from each other in
the network such that they are not in the communication range of each other.
Let there exists a nodew which is in the communication range of v but not in
the communication range of u and they share the common key, k1. Nodes v
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and w can discover the common key k1 between them and can communicate
via this key k1. Suppose node u gets captured then the key k1 gets revealed.
The neighbors of u do not share the key k1 with u. Therefore, they are
unaware of the fact that the key k1 has been compromised. Hence, v and
w will not be informed. Now the adversary can use the key k1 and decrypt
all the messages between v and w. In the preset scenario compromised
keys are not removed completely from the network in Chan et. al. scheme,
compromising the network security.
2. Sybil attack [43] is possible in their proposed scheme. A compromised node
removed from the network is known only to the neighbor. Rest of the network
is not aware of the node that is revoked from the network. Therefore, a clone
can be deployed elsewhere in the network; resulting in a Sybil attack.
3. Path keys established through the compromised node is not revoked.
4. Each node has to store votes for all its neighbors before the deployment. For
this to happen we need to know the network topology before the deployment
which is not always possible.
4.2 Network Model and Assumptions
In this section we discuss the network model and assumptions considered for the
proposed key revocation scheme.
We assume the network is divided into hexagonal regions such that there will
not be more than k number of nodes in each region. Each region have a unique id
< i, j > where i and j are the row and column of that region. Regions are further
divided into two types: basic region and non-basic region. A region < i, j > is
called a basic region if [i%2 = 0 && j%2 = 0 && i%4 6= 0] ‖ [i%4 = 0 &&
j%2 = 1]. Other regions are called non-basic regions. A non-basic regions will
have atmost two basic regions in their neighborhood. Basic regions have a sin-
gle unique trivariate polynomial, whereas a non-basic region will have atmost two
trivariate polynomials assigned to them drawn from each of its neighborhood basic
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Figure 4.1: Division of network into basic and non-basic region
region. f1(x, y, z), f2(x, y, z), ...fn(x, y, z) are trivariate polynomials where highest
degree for x, y, z will be 7k. Figure-4.1 shows the division of network into two
types of regions.
Each node will have a share of the polynomial(s) of it’s region along with a
unique hash function h(). If f1(x, y, z) is the polynomial for a region < i, j >, then
for a node with node id u, the polynomial shares f1(u, y, z) is called authentica-
tion polynomial, auth1u(y, z) and f1(x, u, z) is called the verification polynomial,
verf 1u(x, z) for the node u.
We made the following assumptions :
1. Nodes have a unique identifier.
2. Each node have more than t numbers of neighborhood where t is the mini-
mum number of neighbors who must agree to revoke a node.
3. Number of compromised node in a node’s neighborhood is less than t.
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4. Base station is not prone to compromise.
5. Nodes have built in intrusion detection system.
6. Each node maintains a two-hop neighborhood information.
7. Each node stores all the intermediary nodes for each path key formed.
8. The diameter of a region is greater than 2r where r is the radius of any
node’s communication range.
9. Each node maintains two lists; a Blacklist which contains the list of com-
promised nodes and a Suspected list which contains the list of suspected
neighbor nodes along with the accuser.
Lemma 1 : If two nodes are neighbors of a same node then they will
be situated either in the same or in the neighboring regions.
Proof : When two nodes are in the communication range of each other then they
are in the neighborhood of each other. To become the neighbor of a node, distance
between the two nodes should be less than or equal to r where r is the radius of
node’s communication range. Two nodes which are at a distance greater than r
from each other can not be neighbor of each other. We have assumed that the
diameter of a region to be greater that 2r. Therefore, two nodes which are situated
in non-neighboring regions, the distance between them will always be greater than
2r. Hence, those two nodes can never be neighbors of a same node. Therefore we
can conclude that nodes which are neighbors of a same node lies either in same
region or in the neighboring regions.
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4.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section we proposed two revocation schemes. First scheme is described in
Subsection-4.3.1 and second in Subsection-4.3.2.
4.3.1 Scheme I
The proposed scheme consists of four phases. They are : Setup, Voting, Revoca-
tion and Removal. Action taken in each phase is described below.
1. Setup : In this phase, the network is divided into regions. The Blacklist and
Suspected list at each node is set to empty.
2. Voting : In this phase a node vote against its suspected neighbors. If a node
u wants to vote against one of its neighbor node, say, v, then u will prepare a
message M containing the node id of the victim node v. This message is sent
to all the neighbors of victim node v, and to the base station. Let w be one
of the neighbors of v. Then according to Lemma 1, the nodes u and w are
either from the same region or from the neighboring regions. Therefore, they
have share of a unique polynomial. Let the polynomial be fi(x, y, z). Then u
have authiu(y, z) = fi(u, y, z) and w have verf
i
w(x, z) = fi(x,w, z). The node
u will send the message M along with a single value p = authiu(w, h(M)),
i.e., p = authiu(y, z) at y = w and z = h(M). After receiving the message,
the node w will check the message’s authentication. It will compute the
value q = verf iw(u, h(M)), i.e., q = verf
i
w(x, z) at x = u and z = h(M).
If q = p then the message is authenticated. Node w updates its Suspected
list by inserting the id of node v into the Suspected list if the list does not
contain the id of node v. The name of the accuser that is node u in the
present scenario is also inserted into the list.
Each node maintains a counter on the number of votes registered against
each of its neighbors. A node for which the number of votes registered
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against it crosses the threshold parameter, t, then that node is put under
Blacklist.
When a node x puts a node y in the Blacklist, it performs the following
actions:
(a) Stop communicating with y.
(b) Delete all the keys it shares with y.
(c) Delete all the path keys formed through y.
3. Revocation : The base station, on receiving t number of votes against a node,
will prepare a key revocation message containing the node id of the compro-
mised node and the compromised keys. Then it will broadcast this message,
along with the authentication polynomials corresponding to polynomials as-
signed to each region. The base station will broadcast
∑
fi(base.id, y, h(M1))
where base.id is the id of the base station, and fi(x, y, z) is the set of all the
trivariate polynomials for 1 ≤ i ≤ n where n is the number of basic regions.
4. Removal : After receiving the key revocation message from the base sta-
tion, a node will first check the message authenticity to ensure that it has
come from the base station. A node l with region’s polynomial fk(x, y, z)
will compute fk(base.id, y, h(M1)) where y = l. It will also compute its own
verification polynomial verfkl (x, z) where x = base.id and z = h(M1). If the
above two values are equal, then the message is authenticated. Then the
node l will delete all the keys mentioned in the message and put the victim
node v in the Blacklist. Since, the list of compromised nodes exists in each
node, this can prevent sybil attack and node replication attack.
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4.3.2 Scheme II
This scheme also consists of four phases like Scheme-I. This differs from Scheme-I
in the presence of monitor nodes in each region. Monitor nodes are more secured
than the normal nodes and communicate directly among themselves. Actions per-
formed at each step is explained below :
1. Setup : Action in this phase remain same as that in Scheme-I.
2. Voting : The mechanism of voting remains same as that in Scheme I. How-
ever, the vote is sent to the monitor node of the accuser’s region. On receiv-
ing a vote, monitor node checks whether the suspected node belongs to its
region or not. If not, then it will send this voting information to the monitor
node of victims region. The monitor node of victim’s region will update its
Suspected list. When the number of votes reaches a threshold parameter t
registered against a node, then the corresponding monitor node will inform
other monitor nodes about the compromised node along with the keys that
has been compromised.
3. Revocation : In this phase, the monitor node prepare a message contain-
ing the node id of the compromised node and the compromised keys. This
message is sent to all the nodes in the monitor node’s regions along with
an authentication value for each node. For example, if the monitor node
is m, sending an authentication message M3 to node d then it will send an
authentication value fk(m, d, h(M3)) where fk(x, y, z) is a tri-variate poly-
nomial corresponding to the region of m.
4. Removal : After receiving key revocation message from their corresponding
monitor node, a node checks its authenticity to ensure that it has come from
its monitor node. If the node is l1 then it will compute its own verification
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polynomial verfl(x, z) where x = m and z = h(M3). If this value is equal
to the authentication value sent by the monitor node m, then the message
is authenticated. Then the node, l, deletes all the keys contained in the
message and put the accused node in the Blacklist.
4.4 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme is an improvement over Chan et. al. scheme. It differs from
their scheme in the following ways :
1. We have divided the network into hexagonal regions.
2. The idea of sessions is not used in our proposed scheme.
3. We have used trivariate polynomials whereas their voting procedure was
based on secret sharing of bivariate polynomial.
4. We have used the concept of monitor node was also not present in their
scheme.
In this section we analyze the proposed key revocation mechanism.
1. compromised nodes can not collude and revoke a node as there can not be
more than t numbers of nodes in the neighborhood of a node.
2. To compute a trivariate polynomial, the adversary has to capture all the
nodes having a share of that polynomial. Forgery of a vote is not possible
43
4.4 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
as there will not be more than k number of nodes in each region.
3. Votes are verified so that no false voting results in to revocation of a legit-
imate node. Neighbor nodes will not be able to authenticate the false vote
by an adversary. Therefore, no revocation or updation of Suspected list will
occur.
4. A listener can not replay a vote to generate additional votes.
5. The neighbor nodes do not broadcast the revocation message to the entire
network. Thus, it is not vulnerable to denial of service attack.
6. As all the path keys constructed by the compromised nodes are removed
after the revocation, the adversary can not affect the network computing
the path keys at later stage.
7. The proposed scheme is resistant to Sybil attack or any other kind of repli-
cation attack.
In the proposed schemes, nodes need to store shares of atmost two trivariate
polynomials of degree 7k. Therefore, each node stores atmost four bivariate poly-
nomials of degree 7k. For each bivariate polynomial, a node has to store (7k+ 1)2
number of values. Thus a node needs to store atmost 4 × (7k + 1)2 number of
values.
For key revocation, we need to transmit a unique message authentication uni-
variate polynomial of degree 7k for each region in Scheme I. Therefore, n×(7k+1)
number of values need to be transmitted where n is the number of basic region in
Scheme I. In scheme II only a single value needs to be transmitted.
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Next, we calculate the computation needed for authentication of key revoca-
tion. In Scheme I, during verification, each node gets a univariate polynomial
f(y) of degree 7k. Then, they compute the value of the polynomial f(y) at y =
node id. This computation needs (7k + (7k − 1) + (7k − 1) + ..... + 1) number
of multiplications = 7k(7k + 1)/2 number of multiplications and 7k number of
addition. In Scheme II only a single value is transmitted, hence this computation
is not required. Next step of verification is similar for both the schemes. Each
node needs to compute its verification polynomial. Verification polynomial is a
bivariate polynomial of degree 7k + 1 and it is of the form xm(a1y
m + a2y
m−1 +
a3y
m−2 + .... + am+1) + xm−1(b1ym + b2ym−1 + b3ym−2 + .... + bm+1) + .... where
m = 7k + 1.
Each term within the bracket is a univariate polynomial which needs 7k(7k+1)/2
multiplications and 7k additions. Each of these values again needs to be multi-
plied by x of different power. Total number of multiplications is = 7k(7k+ 1)/2×
(7k + 1) + 7k(7k + 1)/2
= 7k(7k + 1)(7k + 2)/2
Number of additions is = 7k(7k + 1) + 7k
= 7k(7k + 2)
We have shown the comparison of two of our schemes in Table 4.1.
4.5 Conclusion
We have proposed two key revocation model for wireless sensor network in this
paper. In the Scheme I we overcome the problems of the existing algorithm and
Scheme II have been introduced in order to further reduce the communication
cost of Scheme I. In future, any other mechanism can be used for voting technique
so further reduce the storage cost and time to revoke a compromised node. Also
future improvements can be made in terms of reducing the computational and
communication cost.
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Table 4.1: Comparison between key revocation Scheme I and Scheme II
Scheme I Scheme II
Storage Requirement (7k + 1)2 (7k + 1)2
in each node
Number of values (7k + 1)× number of regions 1
to be transmitted
for authentication
polynomial computation: polynomial computation:
multiplications=7k(7k+1)
2
multiplications=0
Message additions=7k additions=0
authentication
cost polynomial verification: polynomial verification:
multiplications=7k(7k+1)(7k+2)
2
multiplications=7k(7k+1)(7k+2)
2
additions=7k(7k + 2) additions=7k(7k + 2)
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Conclusion and Future work
In this thesis we have discussed about the problem of key pre-distribution in wire-
less sensor networks and we have tried to find a solution for that in chapter 3. We
have proposed a key pre-distribution mechanism with the help of BCH coding.
We have got some better resiliency than some of the existing schemes. In future
research can be done in order to find a suitable coding scheme which can increase
the resiliency of the network. A coding technique can be found out with large
number of codewords and large minimum distance so that it can be fitted to key
pre-distribution. Except combinatorial designs, other designs like packing designs,
cover free families and many more unexploited designs can be exploited. In our
work we have concentrated on random node capture attack. In future research
can be done so that selective node capture attack also can be taken care. We have
also proposed a key revocation mechanism. It has overcome some of the problems
existing distributed mechanism has. In future research can be done to reduce the
communicational cost and computational cost further. Also a researches should
be made so that revocation can be done without any help from the Base Station
or monitor nodes.
One outcome of the thesis is the motivation to study designs and coding the-
ory and find out new designs which have not been constructed so far. We hope
that some new structures of the designs and coding schemes will help us in the
betterment of the solution.
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